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Articles
The Kennon ‘factor’: Issues of
indeterminacy and floodgates
Patricia Easteal AM*, Catherine Warden† and Lisa Young‡
The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides no guidance on the way the courts
should treat family violence when determining property disputes. Did the
introduction of the Kennon ‘factor’ fill this void? This article reports on the
application and interpretation of Kennon along with the outcomes in 57 first
instance judgments of the Federal Magistrates Court, the Family Court of
Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia between 2006 and 2012.
We found that only 42% of applications for a Kennon adjustment were
successful with a mean adjustment of 7.3% in those cases where the court
identified the relevant percentage adjustment. There was an apparent
jurisdictional variation in success rate with judicial officers in the ACT making
relatively fewer Kennon adjustments. In examining the judicial application of
Kennon we highlight the diversity in interpretation of specific phrases which
form the cornerstone of the Kennon principle. We also identify examples of
lawyers not raising the Kennon principle when it may have been
appropriate, not identifying the impact of violence on contributions, and not
seeking a percentage adjustment as high as the judicial officer might have
considered. Our conclusion is that the Kennon factor is being under-utilised
and inconsistently applied, and that there is considerable confusion as to its
proper application. We argue the preferred solution is legislative reform
which addresses directly, and in detail, the issue of the relevance of family
violence to the alteration of property interests. In the meantime we suggest
that, at the very least, further education concerning both the impacts of
family violence and the application of the Kennon principle is required within
the relevant professional communities.
Introduction
This article considers the application of the 1997 decision in Kennon v
Kennon,1 which addressed how violence perpetrated by a spouse or de facto
partner is relevant to the assessment of the victim spouse/partner’s
contributions in Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA) property settlement
proceedings. The Full Court held in Kennon that violence can be relevant to
this assessment where a person is subjected to a course of violent conduct by
their partner, which impacts upon that person’s ability to contribute to the
relationship or which makes their contributions significantly more arduous
than they ought to have been. Not surprisingly, the application of the Kennon
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1 (1997) 22 Fam LR 1; (1997) 139 FLR 118; (1997) FLC 92-757 (Kennon).
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principle has not been without its difficulties and over the intervening 17 years
there has been ongoing discussion about its application and indeed whether
this is the best solution to the problem of how to account for what is known
as ‘family violence’ in property proceedings.
It is a particularly important time to be considering this question. The
research underpinning the 2012 reforms to the FLA, which were introduced2
to improve the way family courts deal with allegations of violence in
parenting matters,3 highlighted a lack of appreciation in many professional
circles of the nuances of family violence and its impact on families. If these
issues arise in parenting matters — where dealing with family violence is now
considered to be ‘core business’ of the court4 — it seems likely that there
would be problems of a similar nature arising in property disputes; indeed the
impact of violence on contributions may be far more difficult to appreciate.
For these reasons, and because to date there has been no legislative
intervention, the judicial approach taken to such matters in property
proceedings is of significant interest. The only published study to date
considering outcomes of cases applying the Kennon principle was in 2001 and
that identified only 27 cases.5 We are not aware of any research that quantifies
how common violence allegations are generally in property proceedings,
however, the number of Kennon claims seems small (including in this study)
given that we know violence is commonly reported in the general separated
population, including by those who have property settlement court cases.6
Certainly, the judicial approach to the application of Kennon is likely to
impact on whether Kennon claims are raised, even where the presence of
violence is uncontested. Moreover, the gendered dimension of the impact of
family violence cannot be overlooked and it will most often be women (and
children in their care) who are adversely affected where the impacts of family
violence are not recognised.7
This study seeks to provide further and more recent information on how
Kennon is operating in practice, by analysing cases from 2006–12 (inclusive)
2 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth).
3 For a summary of the themes arising from that research, see K Wilcox, ‘Intersection of
Family Law and Family and Domestic Violence’ (2012) Thematic Review 2 — Re-issue,
Australian Domestic & Family Violence Clearinghouse, at
<http://www.adfvc.unsw.edu.au/PDF%20files/Thematic%20Review_2_Reissue.pdf>
(accessed 19 August 2013).
4 See the findings of the Australian Institute of Family Studies in its review of the 2006 shared
parenting reforms, at <http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fle/evaluationreport.pdf>. For a
summary of that report, see R Kaspiew, M Gray, R Weston, L Moloney, K Hand, L Qu and
the Family Law Evaluation Team, ‘The AIFS evaluation of the 2006 family law reforms: A
summary’, (2011) 86 Family Matters 8.
5 S Middleton, ‘Domestic Violence, Contributions, and s 75(2) Considerations: An Analysis of
Unreported Property Judgments’ (2001) 15 AJFL 230.
6 See the findings in J De Maio, R Kaspiew, D Smart, J Dunstan and S Moore, Australian
Institute of Family Studies, Survey of Recently Separated Parents A study of parents who
separated prior to the implementation of the Family Law Amendment (Family Violence and
Other Matters) Act 2011, 2013 at <http://www.ag.gov.au/Families
AndMarriage/Families/FamilyLawSystem/Documents/SRSP_Report.pdf> (accessed 15
April 2014). In particular note Table 4.18 which shows a third of parents with a property
case reporting physical hurt or unwanted sexual activity before or during separation.
7 There was only one case in those identified in this study where a male partner made a
Kennon claim: Stellard & Dresdon-Stellard [2011] FamCA 718; BC201150691.
2 (2014) 28 Australian Journal of Family Law
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where it was identified that a Kennon adjustment was sought. Before turning
in detail to the study, it is instructive to address briefly the reasons why family
violence has the potential to impact on contributions to family life.
Those who believe domestic violence should be considered in property
settlements have argued that the impacts of violence ‘often make a victim’s
role, whether as child-carer, homemaker or in maintaining a position in the
paid workplace, more onerous’.8 These impacts have been described in the
socio-medical literature:
Even apart from physical injuries sustained as a result of the abuse, battered women
are more likely to suffer from conditions such as depression, anxiety, eating
disorders, psychosomatic symptoms and post-traumatic stress disorder.9
Many victims of family violence suffer trauma.10 Long-term stress resulting
from the trauma ‘can lead to a range of related effects including flashbacks,
difficulty sleeping and/or nightmares, avoidance, detachment and irritability,
all of which can cause significant, and ongoing distress in all areas of
functioning’.11 Thus, family violence can severely hamper a victim’s ability to
make what might be considered normal contributions to a marriage. ‘The
unpredictable nature of the abusive outbursts’ is particularly distressing in
itself.12 Emotional abuse exacerbates feelings of low self-esteem and
self-blame.13 This may result in withdrawing from family members, having
the desire to be alone or even struggling to communicate with others, amongst
other things.14
Indeed, victims of a violent relationship may also have problems in seeking
employment which impact upon their ability to make financial contributions
to the marriage:
A number of studies have documented not only the negative influence of abusers on
their partner’s employment attempts, but also the indirect barrier to job searching
that exists due to subsequent health problems and psychiatric disorders caused by
domestic violence.’15
Further barriers to paid work include that, due to the controlling
8 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Relationships, Report No 113, New South
Wales Law Reform Commission, 2006, p 221.
9 I Evans, Battle-scars: Long Term Effects of Prior Domestic Violence, Monash University:
Centre for Women’s Studies and Gender Research, 2007, p 18. See also D Dobie,
D Kivlahan, C Maynard and K Bush, ‘Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Female Veterans’
(2004) 164(4) Archies of Internal Medicine 94 and N Fagan and K Freme, ‘Confronting
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ (2004) 34(2) Nursing 52.
10 While family violence can take many forms, given the nature of the Kennon factor discussed
further below, severe and persistent violence (that might be characterised as ‘coercive
controlling’ violence) is generally being considered. For a discussion of different typologies
of intimate partner violence, see J Wangmann, ‘Different types of intimate partner violence?
A comment on the Australian Institute of Family Studies report examining allegations of
family violence in child proceedings under the Family Law Act’ (2008) 22 AJFL 123.
11 Evans, above n 9, p 14.
12 D Bagshaw and D Chung, Women, Men and Domestic Violence, April 2000, Partnerships
Against Domestic Violence, at <http://spd.adventistconnect.org/site_data/90/
assets/0001/3499/SA_university.pdf> (accessed 19 August 2013) p 9.
13 Ibid.
14 Evans, above n 9, p 18.
15 Ibid, p 25.
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relationship, victims may have few or out-dated qualifications coupled with
limited work experience.16 Their ability to communicate effectively in an
interview for a job may also be hindered by their low self-esteem.17
Research has identified additionally that women who have experienced
violence tend to receive a lower percentage of the property pool whether with
a court determination or private ordering:18 ‘women who reported
experiencing severe abuse were around three times as likely as women who
reported no physical abuse to indicate receipt of less than a 40% share of the
property.’19 A range of factors may explain this, including the impacts of
continuing dominance, control and fear of the negotiation process. Women
may want to settle quickly in order to secure safety for themselves and their
children. Pursuing legal avenues may involve prolonged contact with their
former violent spouse and compromise their attempts to rebuild strength,
economically and psychologically.20
Thus, it is evident that there are sound arguments in favour of recognising
the impact of family violence in considering spousal contributions under s 79.
However, the court has not always recognised this to be the case, and as this
article discusses, the ‘solution’ presently provided by Kennon is not without its
shortcomings. This article therefore sets out briefly the background to Kennon,
the decision itself and the research to date on how it has been applied. The
methodology for the present study is then outlined and the findings discussed.
Finally, and given the shortcomings in using the Kennon approach identified
by this study, proposals for reform are considered.
The development of the judicial solution
In the 1970s and 1980s, after the introduction of the FLA, allegations of
violence raised in property disputes were largely dismissed by the court.21
This was consistent with the new ‘no-fault’ philosophy, which also led judges
determining parenting disputes to ignore, as irrelevant, the exposure of
children to violence perpetrated against their mothers.22 By the mid-1990s the
effects of violence were starting to be better appreciated by judges, both in
relation to parenting matters and property disputes. However, whereas
violence was introduced as a relevant factor into Pt VII of the FLA (dealing
with children) in 1991,23 there was no such amendment to Pt VIII (dealing
with financial matters). Notwithstanding the absence of legislative direction,
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 G Sheehan and J Hughes, ‘Division of Matrimonial Property in Australia’, Research Paper
25, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2001; G Sheehan and B Smyth, ‘Spousal Violence
and Post-Separation Financial Outcomes’ (2000) 14 AJFL 102 at 111.
19 Sheehan and Smyth, ibid, at 109.
20 Evans, above n 9, p 7.
21 N Alves-Perini, M Harrison, H Rhoades and S Swain, ‘Finding Fault in Marital Property
Law: A Little Bit of History Repeating?’ (2006) 34 Fed L Rev 377 at 388; See also,
H Rhoades, C Frew and S Swain, ‘Recognition of Violence in the Australian Family Law
System: A Long Journey’ (2010) 24 AJFL 296 at 304.
22 R Alexander, ‘Moving forwards or back to the future? An analysis of case law on family
violence under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)’ (2010) UNSWLJ 907 at 914.
23 Protection of children from abuse and harm was included in the ‘best interests checklist’ and
a definition of child abuse was added: Family Law Amendment Act 1991 (Cth).
4 (2014) 28 Australian Journal of Family Law
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the court did, however, develop principles about the relevance of family
violence to outcomes in property disputes.24 While the first example of the
recognition of family violence as a factor relating to the assessment of
contributions in property proceedings is seen in Marriage of Doherty,25 it is
the subsequent 1997 case of Kennon which is now routinely cited in this
regard.
The wife in Kennon, as part of her property application, had made a claim
under cross-vesting legislation for $50,000 in damages for assault and battery.
Coleman J ruled in favour of the wife in relation to two specified events of
battery awarding the wife $8000 in damages (including for psychological
suffering). In the subsequent appeal both parties challenged this outcome
unsuccessfully. However, one of the wife’s submissions at first instance was
that, if she were unsuccessful in her cross-vested claim, the court could, and
should, make an adjustment in her favour under s 75(2)(o) due to the
psychological damage sustained by her and caused by the husband’s conduct.
While Coleman J was not prepared, on the facts, to make any such
adjustment, his Honour concluded that it was open to him to do so, both under
that section and under s 79(4) to the extent that the violence impacted upon the
wife’s contributions as homemaker. In the Full Court, Fogarty and
Lindenmayer JJ, after referring to earlier case law, including Doherty (where
the statements of the Full Court were obiter), and academic commentary in
favour of the recognition of the relevance of family violence to s 79 claims,
concluded as follows on this point:
Put shortly, our view is that where there is a course of violent conduct by one party
towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a
significant adverse impact upon that party’s contributions to the marriage, or, put the
other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than
they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into
account in assessing the parties’ respective contributions within s 79 . . . or to put
differently it would be necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the
course of the marriage and had a discernible impact upon the contributions of the
other party . . .26
Their Honours went on to say this principle was of wider application than
domestic violence; however in considering the floodgates argument said the
adjustment should be applied only to a ‘narrow band of cases’, which thus
24 L Young and G Monahan, Family Law in Australia, 8th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013,
at [13.38]ff. According to the NSW Law Reform Commission, Relationships, Report
No 113, 2006, domestic violence impact can be taken into account in two different ways:
firstly, during the assessment of the parties’ respective contributions to the marriage under
s 79(4), the conduct may be taken into account by way of a Kennon adjustment if evidence
can be presented by the victim that the violence had a significant impact upon their ability
to make contributions. Secondly, the violence may be taken into account during the
assessment of the s 75(2) factors, which include matters such as health and future earning
capacity. In this article we are examining the first and the more common means of
considering violence.
25 (1995) 20 Fam LR 137; (1995) 127 FLR 343; (1996) FLC 92-652.
26 In the Marriage of Kennon (1997) 22 Fam LR 1; (1997) 139 FLR 118; (1997) FLC 92-757
at [24] (emphasis added). In addition, in considering s 75(2) factors the court can look at any
disability resulting from the violence.
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requires something ‘exceptional’ about the case.27 In a separate judgment,
Baker J endorsed his comments in Doherty, reiterating his view that domestic
violence can be relevant under s 79 where it has rendered the victim’s
contributions ‘more onerous’.28
The wife had not argued an increased contribution under s 79 and so the
Full Court did not consider this on the facts. Nor was the s 75(2)(o) argument
considered as the Full Court accepted Coleman J’s finding that no causal link
could be established between her health and the conduct complained of.29
However, the general statements of principle as set out in the joint judgment
have been adopted by subsequent Full Courts,30 confirming their basis as
authority for what is now routinely referred to as the Kennon ‘principle,’
‘adjustment’ or ‘factor’ by judicial officers, lawyers and academics. Its
introduction marked a significant change in family law property proceedings.
As Middleton has commented, the formulation of this test ‘raises as many
issues as it solves’, with there being uncertainty as to the precise ambit of the
principle.31 Drawing from the majority statement above, the key elements to
a Kennon claim are:
• A violent course of conduct,
• During the marriage,
• Requiring proof of a significant adverse/discernible impact,
• Upon a party’s contributions to marriage OR having made those
contributions significantly more arduous (as Middleton comments32
it is not quite clear whether this was intended to create two
alternative limbs or whether the latter is simply an alternative
formulation of the former, but like Middleton we consider that the
likely interpretation is two alternative limbs).
The Full Court, as mentioned earlier, were clear the above factors would only
arise in exceptional circumstances, thus emphasising that only a ‘narrow band
of cases’ would meet these requirements.33 It is also important to note their
Honours said the presence of these factors entitles a court to take them into
account; it appears it does not require the court to do so.
While the ruling was ‘welcomed by many . . . others saw it as a risky
decision that harboured the potential to reintroduce the pre-Family Law Act
approach to property settlements’.34 Concerns included ‘a reluctance to return
to a fault-based approach’ and ‘a fear of “opening the floodgates”’.35 In fact
though, the focus by the judges on the impact on the victim’s contributions in
Kennon, rather than characterising the perpetrator’s conduct as a negative
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, at [169].
29 Ibid, at [208].
30 See, eg, Polonius & York [2010] FamCAFC 228; BC201051123 at [86].
31 Middleton, above n 5, at 231.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Alves-Perini et al, above n 21, at 391; See also, P Nygh, ‘Family Violence and Matrimonial
Property Settlement’ (1999) 13 AJFL 10.
35 Arguments for and against both positive and negative contributions are critiqued thoroughly
by the NSW Law Reform Commission, 2006, Domestic Violence and Property Adjustment,
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_lrc.nsf/pages/LRC_r113chp09#H3>
(accessed 28 August 2013).
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contribution, reflects ‘the Family Law Act’s departure from fault-based
grounds of divorce’:36
It is to be hoped that the Family Court will continue to stress the consequences in
terms of increased needs or increased contribution rather than the conduct which
caused it.37
Moreover, the leading judgment was very clear that it had ‘the floodgates’ in
mind, in making this a principle of narrow application.38 Accordingly, 4 years
later in 2001, Middleton reported finding only 27 cases where Kennon was
applied.39 In 17 of these unreported first instance matters the wife successfully
argued for an increased contribution because of violence, however it was
difficult to determine the extent to which, if at all, this affected the overall
assessment of percentage contribution, with only one case actually identifying
the specific percentage increase (5%) on this basis.40
In 2005, Middleton concluded that the effect of Kennon was limited:
Indeed, over time it has become clear that significant practical and conceptual
difficulties lie in proving to the court’s satisfaction that domestic violence has had a
relevant impact upon a victim’s contribution to the welfare of the family. This
appears to have contributed to reluctance on the part of lawyers and Family Court
judges alike to deal with the violence issue. It is telling that, in the eight years [as
at 2005] since Kennon was handed down, no subsequent reported cases have taken
domestic violence into account as an aspect of the victim’s contribution or in relation
to the assessment of s 75(2) factors.41
As noted above, this is the last, and only, published analysis of the operation
of Kennon.
The current study
Do Middleton’s findings still hold? Have there been ongoing problems in the
application and interpretation of Kennon as identified by Middleton42 or has
the passage of time clarified the ambit and proper application of the principle?
Fifty-seven relevant first instance judgments were identified in which a
Kennon claim was raised by one of the parties during the years 2006–12
36 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Relationships, Report No 113, 2006, p 218.
37 Nygh, above n 34, at 13.
38 In the Marriage of Kennon (1997) 22 Fam LR 1; (1997) 139 FLR 118; (1997) FLC 92-757
at [24].
39 Middleton, above n 5, at 231. At the time of Middleton’s analysis, unreported judgments of
the Family Court were not generally available to members of the public. Her sample is the
result of an electronic search of an initiative of the Family Court library at that time — a
national database of single judge decisions. She notes that the database was still under
construction and contained only a ‘majority’ of all the first instance judgments of the court.
Further, it did not include any cases determined by the State Family Court of Western
Australia. Her search terms included violence, assault, abuse, rape and Kennon.
40 Middleton, ibid.
41 S Middleton, ‘Matrimonial Property Reform: Legislating for the ‘Financial Consequences’
of Domestic Violence’ (2005) 19 AJFL 9 at 9.
42 Thus, our sample has no overlap with either of the previous research studies that considered
case law post-Kennon. See Middleton, above n 5 and Alves-Perini et al, above n 21.
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(inclusive)43 using the Australasian Legal Information Institute (AUSTLII)44
online database with the search terms ‘property AND violence AND
Kennon’.45 Another 11 cases were identified in which Kennon was mentioned
by the judicial officer, but not raised by the lawyers or parties; these are
discussed separately. Twenty-five of the 57 hearings took place in the Family
Court of Australia, 30 in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (Family)
(now the Federal Circuit Court of Australia) and two were heard in the Family
Court of Western Australia. The following information was recorded for each
case: name; hearing date; registry; judicial officer; whether parties were
represented or not; nature of allegation (type of violence); period of violence;
alleged impact on contributions; evidence required to establish violence and
impact; whether or not an adjustment was made on the basis of Kennon; if an
adjustment was made, what the percentage was; whether any s 75(2) factor
adjustment was made on the basis of the impact of domestic violence; and
what impact ‘test’ was referred to in the reasoning for an application or
rejection of the Kennon principle (that is, which of the two limbs was referred
to).
NVivo 10,46 a computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA)
software program, was used to assist with qualitative data analysis. While this
software does not directly analyse data itself, the main purpose for using this
software was to hold and organise data for analysis. All judgments in our
sample were uploaded and coded according to the factors mentioned above
into ‘nodes’. Particular focus was given to judicial comments made about the
type of violence required for a Kennon claim; the duration of violence
required to be considered ‘a course of violent conduct’; the alleged impact of
the violence upon contributions to the marriage; the evidence that was
required to demonstrate impact upon contributions; what was required to
categorise a case as ‘exceptional’; and how a percentage adjustment was
reasoned.
A limitation of our methodology is that not all cases appear on AUSTLII.
Also, we deliberately did not include matters heard following the 2012 family
violence amendments.47 However, our dataset provides a useful benchmark
study and uses the most comprehensive source of Australian family law
judgments available together with a reliable search facility. While it is
speculation, one would imagine that the rarity of Kennon claims, as discussed
below, in fact favours the likelihood that cases considering this principle will
be referred for citation in AUSTLII.
43 This reflects the period after Middleton published her papers. A list of the cases is available
from the authors.
44 Australasian Legal Information Institute, AUSTLII (February 2013) Australasian Legal
Information Institute website <http://www.AUSTLII.edu.au> (accessed 4 February 2013).
45 Limiting our timeframe ensured that there were no unintentional biases due to effects of
legislative change mid-2012 in how the term ‘domestic violence’ (referred to as ‘family
violence’) is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA). The search terms were
chosen on the basis that we are seeking to analyse those matters in which the judicial officer
mentions both Kennon and allegations of violence.
46 QSR International, NVivo 10 (February 2013) QRS International
<http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx> (accessed 4 February 2013).
47 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth).
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Floodgates appear to have remained closed
For the 6 year period (2006–12) there were only 57 matters identified in which
Kennon was raised. Why so few, particularly when violence is so commonly
raised in family law parenting proceedings and is commonly reported in the
separated population?48 It is possible that a lack of understanding of Kennon
on the part of some lawyers and self-represented parties plays a role here. As
stated earlier, 11 cases were excluded from the sample since the parties to the
proceedings failed to raise a Kennon argument in circumstances where the
judicial officer later referred to the principle.49 In nine of these 11 cases, the
judicial officer specifically identified this omission and concluded therefore
the violence would not be considered. For example:50
At the commencement of the trial I asked the wife’s counsel if he sought there to be
a Kennon type argument where it is alleged that the violent conduct of one party
towards another during a marriage was demonstrated to have a significant adverse
impact on the parties contribution to their marriage, or, put it the other way, to have
made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have
been. I was informed by counsel for the wife that no such argument was being put.51
It was further submitted that the mental health issues from which the wife is
currently suffering can be attributed to the marriage, the psychological abuse to
which she was subjected to by the husband during that period, to its breakdown and
then the subsequent assault on Mr J by the husband. However, the wife’s counsel fell
short of positing an argument of the type set out in Kennon v Kennon . . .52
48 It is very difficult to get figures on actual numbers of property applications and trials in a
year for any court. However, by way of example, in the Family Court of Australia in the
2006/07 year 4034 applications were filed involving financial issues. In that year, 8% of
matters resolved had done so via a trial (note that in the 2004/05 period only 4.5% reached
trial). In the 2010/11 year there were 2209 applications for final orders involving financial
issues with over 10% of matters in that year proceeding to trial. These figures are taken from
the Court’s Annual Reports published on their website: <www.familycourt.gov.au>. Note
too that recent research consistently confirms how common allegations of violence are in
family law matters.
49 These were identified in the search as the Judge or Magistrate had made reference to
Kennon. Of course, there may have been insufficient evidence to establish such a claim in
some of the cases. In one case, IABH & HRBH [2010] FamCA 110; BC201050072 at [317]
per Watts J, it was a second rehearing of a matter, and the retrial did not permit
reconsideration of pre-separation contributions. However, in the context of a reconsideration
of the s 75(2) evidence, Watts J indicated no Kennon argument had been run in relation to
violence, which suggests this was true throughout the life of this case, both in relation to
contributions and the impact of violence on future needs.
50 Emphasis added. This is perhaps unsurprising where the alleged violence is not claimed to
have impacted upon future needs factors (s 75(2)), as consideration of the impact of violence
is not expressly required under s 79 of the FLA. Technically though there is no reason why
the ‘any other matter’ catch-all in FLA s 75(2)(o), which is relevant to property proceedings
by virtue of s 79(4)(e)(e), would not permit the court to consider such matters in relation to
contribution even if not raised by the parties.
51 Wheat & Wheat [2008] FamCA 266; BC200851128 at [48] per Benjamin J.
52 Wilmot & Schneider [2009] FMCAfam 932; BC200909918 at [181] per Bender FM.
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There is detail of evidence in the wife’s case about violent and destructive conduct
by the husband during the periods spanning the relationship of the husband and wife.
This was not raised as an issue in the list provided to me by the advocates . . . I will
not further address that issue.53
In the wife’s affidavit there was extensive reference to matters of violence alleged to
have been perpetrated by the husband upon the wife. The husband denies the alleged
violence. No Kennon v Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 case was referred to in
submissions. As a result I have ignored those parts of the wife’s affidavits, which
allege violence by the husband upon the wife.54
The judgments shed no light on why Kennon arguments were not put
however one would not expect judicial officers to mention a principle in
circumstances where it clearly could not apply. Rather, it might be assumed
the potential application of Kennon was the reason for the judicial officer
making clear that the argument was not run, and so not considered. Certainly
it is possible that strategic, evidentiary, costs and personal issues may have led
to a conscious decision not to run a Kennon argument in individual cases,
which might include an assessment that such an argument would fail in the
particular case. It is also possible however, particularly in light of our findings
below about the lack of clarity as to the application of the Kennon principle,
that potentially successful claims were overlooked or under explored.
Success rate of Kennon claims
As demonstrated in Table 1, in 42% of the 57 judgments where a Kennon
adjustment was sought, this factor was held to warrant an adjustment. This is
less than the 62% success rate found in Middleton’s study of earlier case law.55
Table 1: Registry by Outcome
Registry Number
Yes No
Adelaide (n=4) 2 2
Brisbane (n=6) 3 3
Canberra (n=5) 1 4
Darwin (n=3) 0 3
Hobart (n=1) 0 1
Melbourne (n=13) 7 6
Newcastle (n=1) 0 1
Parramatta (n=5) 3 2
Perth (n=2) 1 1
Sydney (n=17) 7 10
TOTAL: (n=57) 24 33
53 Liakos & Zervos [2011] FamCA 547; BC201150531 at [244] per Loughnan JR.
54 Tian & Larson [2009] FamCA 1307; BC200951244 at [265] per Le Poer Trench J (this was
an appeal from the decision of Bender FM).
55 Middleton, above n 5. Although Middleton’s sample is comparatively small, comparison of
the samples and presentation of results in percentages are valid as the numbers are large
enough a statistical significance test to be run.
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Of the 57 cases, the violence claimed was accepted by the judicial officer as
having occurred in 72% of matters (n=41). Thus, of these 41 matters, 59% of
applicants were successful in receiving a Kennon adjustment (n=24). There
were therefore 17 matters where, although the judicial officer accepted that
violence had taken place, no adjustment was made. Possible reasons for this
are explored further below.
While the numbers are very small, it is interesting to note that all registries
which heard two or more Kennon claims had a comparatively equal division
of successful and unsuccessful claims, except for Canberra where one of the
five succeeded. This may be attributed at least in part to the views of
Brewster FM (as he then was) who is based in that registry and heard two
Canberra cases. His Honour has refused to apply the Kennon principle:56
. . . I am not bound by the dicta of the Court in Kennon and for the reasons I have
given I decline to follow it. I believe that contributions are to be measured in
absolute terms and not weighted by considerations of arduousness, whether caused
by domestic violence or otherwise.57
Size of Kennon adjustment
No guidelines are provided within Kennon as to how any increase in
percentage for contribution should be calculated. This is of course consistent
with the general approach to the application of s 79, namely, that it is a matter
of discretion for the judicial officer. Altobelli FM noted in Kucera & Kucera
however that:
its assessment needs to be approached conservatively for the policy reasons that are
clearly articulated in the Full Court’s decision.58
In 11 of the 24 cases with successful Kennon claims, the increased
percentage attributed to the Kennon claim was not specifically articulated.59
An example of this is as follows: ‘. . . I assess the wife’s entitlement at 55%
and that of the husband at 45%. I do so by weighing up all the factors I have
addressed . . .’.60
In Kucera, where Altobelli FM awarded a Kennon adjustment of 15% (the
56 Brewster FM outlined his reasons in detail in Palmer & Palmer (2010) 244 FLR 121; [2010]
FMCAfam 999; BC201007281 at [75]–[100] and as an addendum in Brandow & Brandow
[2010] FMCAfam 1026; BC201007395 at [27]. In Palmer & Palmer (2010) 244 FLR 121;
[2010] FMCAfam 999; BC201007281 at [93]–[94] his Honour suggested that, if violence is
to be relevant to contributions, perhaps a more appropriate consideration would be to reduce
the contributions of the perpetrator to the welfare of the family, rather than to increase the
weight of the victim’s contributions. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider in detail
the arguments put by Brewster FM as to whether or not this principle is legally justifiable,
though his Honour raises some important points of principle in his discussion which are
touched on later in this paper.
57 Palmer & Palmer (2010) 244 FLR 121; [2010] FMCAfam 999; BC201007281 at [95] per
Brewster FM.
58 Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073 at [103] (emphasis added).
59 Middleton reported the same in ‘several’ of the 17 successful Kennon claims in her study:
Middleton, above n 5, at 237.
60 Parsons & Prendergast [2008] FamCA 259; BC200851121 at [95] per Guest J.
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highest figure a judicial officer overtly attributed to Kennon), his Honour
describes the indeterminacy of the assessment of any aspect of a parent’s
contributions:
What I am doing, however, is trying to assess (as a percentage of the value of the
assets in question) the extent to which the wife’s contribution was rendered
‘significantly more arduous than they might have been’. This process is as subjective
and discretionary as any other discretionary exercise of power. I take into account
the length of the period of family violence in this case — the entire marriage. I take
into account its frequency and nature — it was coercive controlling violence that
was [sic] pattern of abuse. I take into account the strength of the evidence of family
violence and its impacts on the wife and the contribution she made to the marriage.
All of these matters justify an assessment of 15% in the wife’s favour.61
Lawyers can play an important role in shaping this exercise of judicial
discretion in any family court property case by effectively setting the
parameters of a decision by arguing for a particular percentage adjustment of
assets. This was also true in terms of how the Kennon factor was assessed. In
two cases62 the judicial officer considered whether they should award a higher
percentage than was sought; in both instances the judicial officer declined to
move beyond the maximum adjustment sought by the party (or more likely
their lawyer). In Czeb & Czeb,63 Barry J was somewhat unclear as to whether
he would have ordered a higher adjustment if asked, saying ‘[i]t has crossed
my mind to award to the Applicant a percentage distribution greater than that
which she seeks, but in the whole of the circumstances, I have decided not to
adopt this course.’64 Altobelli FM on the other hand clearly considered himself
more constrained by the parameters set by the parties:
Counsel for the wife submitted it should be 10 percent. I accept this figure as being
appropriate under the circumstances of this case, but, quite frankly, if I had been
asked to assess contribution at a higher figure, I would have.65
In the 13 cases where the judicial officer did specify the percentage value
of the Kennon award, the mean adjustment awarded was 7.3%. The most
common percentage figure awarded overall was 10%, closely followed by 5%.
The lowest percentage figure awarded was 4% (in 2 of the 13 cases). More
than half the cases identified the Kennon percentage, in contrast to the single
case out of 17 to do so in Middleton’s study. The increased rate of
identification obviously aids analysis of the exercise of judicial discretion, and
promotes transparency in decision making, though as always it is difficult to
draw something concrete from the ‘leap from words to figures’.66
61 Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073 at [110] per Altobelli FM
(emphasis added).
62 Czeb & Czeb [2011] FamCA 87; BC201150108 at [87] per Barry J and Kozovska &
Kozovski [2009] FMCAfam 1014; BC200908956 at [77] per Altobelli FM.
63 [2011] FamCA 87; BC201150108 at [87] per Barry J.
64 Ibid.
65 Kozovska & Kozovski [2009] FMCAfam 1014; BC200908956 at [77]. Note that the terms of
s 79(1) make it clear the court can make ‘such order as it considers appropriate’.
66 See Coleman J in Steinbrenner & Steinbrenner [2008] FamCAFC 193; BC200851355 at
[234] on this point in the context of reflecting quantitatively the qualitative assessment of
contributions under s 79.
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Elements of Kennon
The ‘discretionary exercise of power’67 referred to earlier by Altobelli FM is
not limited to the calculation of any percentage adjustment. The formulation
of the Kennon principle outlined at the outset of this paper makes it clear that
it has a discretionary aspect, most notably by stating that the presence of the
relevant factors merely ‘entitles’ the court to apply the principle. However, a
review of the decisions suggests that in addition there is considerable variation
in how a number of elements of this principle are being interpreted by judicial
officers. We will now consider how the cases in the sample dealt with the
various elements of the Kennon principle.
‘Narrow Band’ of cases — what constitutes the
‘exceptional cases’?
It is clear that there must be something ‘exceptional’ about the case — arising
from the nature of the violence and its impact — for the principle to apply. In
the unreported decision of Spagnardi, the Full Court said the term
‘exceptional’ was not to be understood to mean ‘rare’. Rather, they preferred
the approach of the trial judge in that case:
the references to ‘exceptional cases’ and ‘narrow band of cases’ occurs in the context
of the principle of misconduct in general rather than the more narrow formulation
about domestic violence . . . [I]t is not necessarily correct that only cases of
exceptional violence or a narrow band of domestic violence cases fall within the
principles . . . reading these passages carefully, the key words in a case where there
are allegations of domestic violence are ‘significant adverse impact’ and ‘discernable
impact’.68
Notwithstanding this, in one case, Stellard v Dresden Stellard,69 O’Reilly J
spoke as if the ‘narrow band of cases’ requirement was a separate and
necessary consideration (turning on the nature of the violence), in addition to
the requirement to show the impact of the violence.70
The forty-two percent of cases that were successful may seem to be
indicative of a high success rate given that the principle only applies to
‘exceptional’ cases, however, it must be considered in light of the very low
number of cases where this argument is raised by a party. Without any
yardstick to measure what is exceptional and what is not, such an assessment
may naturally seem subjective and arbitrary, relying on judicial interpretation
as to what constitutes exceptional circumstances in terms of the severity of the
behaviour and the way the violence impacts on a relationship. However, a
context-based assessment is surely what the Full Court intended.
While it is not a separate criterion as such, clearly some judicial officers
consider it important to highlight the need for the case to be ‘exceptional’.
Moore J, for example, implied that the duration and seriousness of the
violence and its ongoing impact on contributions may contribute to such a
determination:
67 Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073 at [110] per Altobelli FM.
68 Spagnardi & Spagnardi (unreported, Appeal No EA26 of 2003) at [46].
69 [2011] FamCA 718; BC201150691.
70 Ibid, at [286] and [298].
The Kennon ‘factor’ 13
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 20 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Mon May 26 16:36:20 2014
/journals/journal/ajfl/vol28pt1/part_1
. . . His conduct, she said, had a deleterious impact on her capacity to further her
career over the many years of their relationship. That is the link Kennon makes
necessary and the persistence of this serious problem over many years takes it out
of the ‘floodgates’ reservation and puts it into the ‘exceptional cases’ spoken of in
Kennon . . .71
Ongoing serious violence alone will not suffice, of course. In Dodge &
Meldrum, Brown FM accepted the victim’s evidence of ‘the husband’s violent
treatment’ which was ‘frequent’ and ‘serious’, having commenced on the eve
of their three year marriage. However, his Honour noted he had to ‘adopt a
cautious approach to such issues’ (presumably reflecting the floodgates
consideration) and ultimately did not find the overall circumstances ‘to be
exceptional in the terms referred to by the Full Court’.72 This was because the
wife did not establish the violence had ‘a sufficiently delineated impact upon
her homemaking contributions’.73
The explanation as to why the case was not exceptional was less clear,
however, in other cases. In Wei & Wei74 Barry J accepted the evidence of one
particularly serious assault about 2 months after separation and the ‘[w]ife’s
claims of domestic violence and controlling behaviour by the Husband’75
(though it is not clear from the judgment precisely what those claims were).
This case involved a marriage of about 5½ years throughout which the wife
worked as well as being primary carer to the parents’ child. A psychiatric
assessment of the father described him as exhibiting ‘significant obsessional
traits with a need for control’.76 With little explanation, Barry J concluded that
‘the case as presented did not amount to one that would persuade me it comes
within the relatively narrow band of cases provided for in the decision of
Kennon’.77
Given that the factors that will establish a Kennon claim are themselves
susceptible to interpretation, as the cases indicate, the need for the case to be
‘exceptional’ takes on greater significance. In a sense, it is the lens through
which the other factors are considered; however, the judicial guidance to date
is less than clear on precisely what tips the scales.
A course of violent conduct
A ‘course of violent conduct’ must be demonstrated as it forms part of the
overall test for a Kennon adjustment. The Full Court in Kennon did not
describe, nor provide examples, of what behaviours might constitute such a
course. However, in 2005 in S v S78 the Full Court provided some further
insights. In dismissing the appeal by a husband against a Federal Magistrate’s
Kennon adjustment of 5%, the Full Court held the term ‘course of conduct’ is
a broad one; that violence need not be frequent to constitute a course of
71 May Laguna & Laguna [2007] FamCA 320 at [77] per Moore J (emphasis added).
72 [2010] FMCAfam 119; BC201002000 at [131] at [132] and [138].
73 Ibid, at [137].
74 [2007] FamCA 527; BC200750576 per Barry J.
75 Ibid, at [150].
76 Ibid, at [54].
77 Ibid, at [150].
78 (2005) FLC 93-246; [2005] FamCA 1304.
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conduct, although a degree of repetition is required.79 In this case, the husband
was found to be sporadically physically violent and regularly verbally abusive
towards the wife over the course of a 16 year marriage. This affected the
wife’s self-esteem and her ability to perform her role as a primary caregiver
and homemaker for much of the marriage.
In our sample, there was no simple correlation between the length of the
course of violent conduct and the likelihood of a successful Kennon claim.
The violence alleged was often inflicted on the claimant during the whole or
most of the marriage, and, as noted above, Moore J seemed to equate length
with an ‘exceptional’ case.80 Nevertheless, we found one example in which
violence was alleged to have taken place over a long period of time; rather
than helping establish this factor, in fact it seemed to weigh against the
claimant:
There is an inherent unfairness in raising, many years after the event, conduct that
could and perhaps should, have been addressed at the time. Recollections fade,
witnesses become unavailable and records are lost. Indeed that may be an
explanation for the wife’s evidence about the husband’s conduct during the
preponderance of the marriage, being vague and general.81
This is a somewhat odd comment, given these matters were naturally only
being raised as a result of the separation and consequent property proceedings.
However, it highlights the difficulties of trying to establish factors relevant to
contribution that are of a non-financial nature, particularly over the course of
a long marriage.
‘During the marriage’
Should judges consider the effects of violence, or indeed violence itself,
following the end of the marriage? The question is what, if anything, did
Fogarty and Lindenmayer JJ mean by referring to a course of violent conduct
‘during the marriage’. Was this phrase intended somehow to limit the
principle? Given that post-separation contributions are relevant to the
application of s 79, on the face of it one might assume that the relevant
enquiry is whether the pre-separation violence (or indeed any post-separation
violence) has inhibited contributions made by the victim pre-trial.
There has been some confusion in the decisions on this point.82 In Kucera
& Kucera, Altobelli FM first says: ‘The Full Court’s decision focuses on
conduct during the marriage, but not afterwards, which suggests the concept
was not intended to apply to post-separation contribution.’83 His Honour does
not consider two points, however. First, for the purposes of property
settlement it is the period of cohabitation, rather than marriage, which is
79 Ibid, at [65]. The violence alleged against the husband apparently comprised ‘arguments or
incidents’ occurring about twice yearly.
80 May Laguna & Laguna [2007] FamCA 320 at [77] per Moore J.
81 Cornwell & Cornwell [2009] FamCA 1072; BC200950999 at [108] per Loughnan JR; see
also Meiloakitau & Taumoepeau [2008] FamCA 476; BC200850801 at [149] per
Loughnan JR.
82 See the comment in Stellard & Stellard Dresdon [2011] FamCA 718; BC201150691 at [298]
recognising that uncertainty.
83 [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073 at [16].
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significant to contributions under s 79, including contributions to the welfare
of the family.84 It is possible the Full Court, cognisant of this fact, was not
attaching particular significance to the words ‘during marriage’. Second, the
Full Court was making explicit that the Kennon principle was not relevant to
the assessment of future needs under s 75(2) and in that context distinguishing
between what happened pre-trial and post-trial.
Altobelli FM does later refer to this latter aspect of Kennon saying:
. . . Kennon principles operate retrospectively, and not prospectively . . . The issue is
to what extent was contribution during the marriage rendered more arduous, not to
what extent family violence during the marriage creates future needs . . . Thus the
fact that the wife appears to have prospered after the end of a violent relationship
does not affect the assessment of contribution during the relationship.85
The point being made here is that because the enquiry is about the impact
of contributions during marriage, rather than on future needs under s 75(2), it
is irrelevant if the wife recovers after separation; this is entirely consistent
with the Full Court’s formulation. However, if the violence did continue to
affect a party’s ability to contribute during that post-separation, pre-trial
period, presumably it could be considered. This approach is reflected in the
decision of Watts J where an uplift (on certain assets) of 5% was awarded for
the contributions the wife made ‘since separation’ from ‘what they would have
been had they not been made significantly more arduous by the husband’s
conduct’.86
In Baranski & Baranski,87 Brown FM recites Altobelli FM’s original
comment focussing on the duration of the marriage and interprets it to mean
that isolated incidents of violence arising around the time of separation should
not attract the Kennon principle. What follows is a discussion which, in reality,
goes to why violence arising around the time of separation might not generally
fit the Kennon profile. However, Brown FM once again tries to draw some
connection to the question of violence ‘during the marriage’:
The powerful emotions precipitated, on separation, may cause a spouse to behave
inappropriately or even violently in the heat of the moment. Such behaviour is likely
to be isolated and often completely out of character, being reflective of a person
reacting to an episode of emotional crisis. In such circumstances, it would be
fundamentally unfair that such isolated episodes should have ramifications for the
assessment of contributions made over the entire and often lengthy period of a
84 In the marriage of G (1984) 9 Fam LR 969; (1984) FLC 91-582.
85 Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073 at [107]. The husband had argued
that the adjustment allowed on the basis of Kennon should be reduced on the basis the wife
was able to make post-separation contributions with ease.
86 Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535; BC201250749 at [179]. See also O’Reilly J’s
comment in Stellard & Dresdon-Stellard [2011] FamCA 718; BC201150691 at [298] where
her Honour notes the question of whether post-separation impacts might be taken into
account in respect of post-separation contributions.
87 [2010] FMCAfam 918; BC201010421 at [390].
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marriage. This also seems to be the rationale as to why usually Kennon-type issues
should be confined to the assessment of contributions within the parameters of the
marriage concerned.88
As it happens, Baranski went on appeal before Bryant CJ, Coleman and
Ainslie-Wallace JJ, and the husband challenged Brown FM’s decision on the
precise point of whether post-separation acts of violence were relevant to a
Kennon claim.89 In a joint judgment, their Honours emphatically rejected the
argument that post-separation violence could not be a relevant consideration
in the assessment of contributions under s 79. Exclusion of such
considerations, said their Honours, may be ‘conducive’ to outcomes that are
not just and equitable, as required under s 79(2).90 So, despite some initial
confusion arising from the way the Kennon criteria were originally framed, it
is now clear that post-separation (and logically also pre-marriage) violence
can be considered in determining whether a Kennon adjustment should be
made.
‘Significant adverse,’ ‘significantly more arduous’ and
‘discernible impact’
The impact requirement of the Kennon principle requires that a party makes
the specific claim that violence impacted upon their ability to make
contributions and articulate how. Impact was raised directly in 21 of the 24
cases which were successful in receiving a Kennon adjustment. These
claimants each tended to describe two or more different ways in which the
violence had affected their contributions. For instance, one claimant was able
to establish that ‘she was a traumatised and fearful parent’ who was ‘isolated
and intimidated’ which made homemaker tasks more difficult and affected her
‘self-esteem and sense of identity’, as well as placing a restriction on her
relationships.91 Another woman established many years of physical and
emotional abuse by her husband resulting in a major depressive order; she led
evidence in support that this caused a significant reduction in her ability to
function on a day to day basis. She had to make repeated attempts to escape
the husband and made a suicide attempt.92
In the three cases where Kennon claims were successful despite not
describing the effect on contribution, one alternative approach taken by some
judicial officers was to ‘infer’ the violence had made the victim’s ability to
contribute during the marriage ‘more arduous’ or that it had had a ‘significant
adverse impact’.93
Notwithstanding the need to show impact, across the total sample of 57
cases there were 25 matters where the claimants or their counsel failed to
make a direct reference to the impact the violence had on the party’s ability
88 Baranski & Baranski [2010] FMCAfam 918; BC201010421 at [396]–[397] (emphasis
added). See also Kozovska & Kozovski [2009] FMCAfam 1014; BC200908956 per
Altobelli FM.
89 Baranski & Baranski (2012) 259 FLR 122; [2012] FamCAFC 18; BC201250070.
90 Ibid, at [257].
91 Baranski & Baranski [2010] FMCAfam 918; BC201010421 at [403].
92 Tolbiac & Tolbiac [2008] FamCA 265; BC200851125 per Brown J.
93 This is discussed in the next section.
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to contribute to the marriage. This would of course have affected the likely
success of the claim. Why would counsel overlook this matter?94 It may be
that lawyers are relying on a judicial inference being drawn, as described
further below; or it might reflect a misunderstanding of this element of
Kennon. It would hardly be surprising if lawyers were confused as to how to
argue this principle given that it seems to cause judicial officers some
considerable confusion. It may also be that, within the contributions
assessment framework of s 79, the impacts of violence on contributions are
subtle and difficult to articulate.
The term ‘significant adverse impact’ upon contributions could be read to
suggest that the victim made a lesser contribution than they could have made
and hence the court should increase their contribution to what it would have
been, but for the violence. However, the majority in Kennon follow this
formulation with the words ‘put another way’ and then go on to talk of a
contribution being made more arduous. A plain reading would suggest the
second formulation of impact (relating to a contribution becoming more
arduous) is simply to elaborate upon the words ‘significant adverse impact’.
However, the particular phrase used to express the second formulation — ‘to
have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought
to have been’ — would seem to indicate that the contributions had been made
but that they were made more difficult by the violence thus requiring the court
to give more weight to them.95 Thus, there are two possible interpretations.
The narrower is that it must be shown the significant impact is making
contributions more arduous; the broader is that this is one way of showing
impact.
It appeared to be accepted by the majority of judicial officers during their
discussion of the Kennon principle that ‘more arduous’ and ‘significant
adverse impact’ are two different tests or limbs — ‘more arduous’ indicating
that the tasks were made harder, and ‘significant adverse impact’ meaning that
less of a contribution was made. For example, Loughnan JR explains:
As to the two limbs of the Kennon argument — here there is no suggestion that the
wife was prevented from making contributions because of the alleged conduct . . . As
to the second limb, the wife does not give evidence about the husband’s conduct
making her contributions more arduous than they ought to have been . . .96
Strickland J differentiates too between an ability to make contributions and
whether they were in fact more arduous:
there was virtually no evidence that satisfies me that that behaviour or conduct had
a ‘significant adverse impact upon (the wife’s) contributions to the marriage’ or
‘made (the wife’s) contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have
been’ . . . The wife still went about her daily tasks in caring for the children and
running the household and performed them well, and she will receive credit for what
94 Of the 25 cases where impact was not raised, only one claimant was self-represented.
95 See on this Middleton, above n 5; See also Family Law Council (Des Semple), Letter of
Advice to Attorney-General, Violence and Property Proceedings, 14 August 2001, p 3.
96 Cornwell & Cornwell [2009] FamCA 1072; BC200950999 at [104]; See also, Meiloakitau
& Taumoepeau [2008] FamCA 476; BC200850801 at [148] per Loughnan JR.
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she actually did, but to repeat, there is no evidence that indicates those tasks were
more onerous because of the husband’s behaviour or conduct.97
In our sample, the terms ‘more arduous’ and ‘more difficult’ were referred
to in just over two thirds of cases. This may be explained by the fact that
claimants predominantly argued that their contributions were made more
arduous than they should have been, rather than that they would have made
greater contributions but for the violence.
Highlighting the uncertainty concerning whether or not there are two limbs
as described above, there were some cases where the judicial officer did not
clearly identify the test as being two-limbed, referring only to a victim’s
contribution being made more arduous.98
Further confusion has arisen by the additional inclusion of the term
‘discernible impact’; Altobelli FM’s reference to this phrase indicates it is
perhaps a phrase intended to capture both limbs of the test.99 Carmody J posits
likewise:
What the majority in Kennon meant by ‘discernible impact’ is not clear but they
obviously envisaged contribution being measured according to the capacity of the
party to make it and the degree of difficulty he or she may have in doing so.100
‘Which is demonstrated’
Leaving aside the question of judicial officers drawing inferences as to impact,
discussed below, it is clear from statements within the sample judgments that
the court will require proof of both the course of violence and its impact on
contribution.101 Accordingly, it was found that an important factor influencing
outcomes which appeared within the sample was whether or not the
allegations of violence were corroborated by evidence in addition to that of the
alleged victim and perpetrator such as police, medical and/or family
consultant reports, criminal charges or a family violence order. Of the total
sample, the violence (and possibly its effect on contribution)102 was
corroborated by additional evidence in 70% of cases (n=40);103 it was
corroborated by additional evidence in 92% of cases where a Kennon
adjustment was awarded. While adducing such corroborative evidence did not
necessarily guarantee a Kennon adjustment, as would be expected there was
a higher likelihood of an adjustment being awarded where it was presented.
97 Dowdell & Public Trustee of the Northern Territory [2007] FamCA 1276; BC200750312
at [161]–[162].
98 See, eg, Baranski & Baranski [2010] FMCAfam 918; BC201010421 at [387] and Dodge &
Meldrum [2010] FMCAfam 119; BC201002000 at [136], though these were both decisions
of Brown FM.
99 See, eg, Bingham & Bingham [2009] FMCAfam 99; BC200900560 at [25].
100 Murphy & Murphy [2007] FamCA 795; BC200750675 at [725].
101 Bodar-Twersky & Twersky [2009] FMCAfam 163; BC200901530 at [99] per Neville FM;
Bingham & Bingham [2009] FMCAfam 99; BC200900560 at [48] per Altobelli FM.
102 It is difficult to distinguish what evidence went to proving which element, as in most
judgments this level of detail was not included.
103 One would have thought this was rather a low figure, where a Kennon claim is being made.
However, it must be noted that even in parenting matters claims of violence are often poorly
presented to court: L Moloney, ‘Violence allegations in parenting disputes: Reflections on
court-based decision making before and after the 2006 Australian family law reforms’
(2008) 14 Jnl of Family Studies 254 at 257.
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Evidentiary problems might occur then if the complainant is solely a
homemaker and does not seek medical or other external help following any of
the family abuse experienced. In such cases, there would be little evidence
except the victim’s own that their contributions were affected. Therefore, from
the sample cases it appears to be easier to show that violence had made an
impact on contributions where, for example, the claimant was required to seek
refuge somewhere else:
I find that the wife’s contributions during the marriage were made far more difficult
because of the husband’s behaviour. At least as importantly, had the husband not
behaved in the way he did, the wife’s contributions would not have been wasted on
renting homes for herself, when she had her own home in which she could have been
living.104
Of course, providing evidence sufficient to establish that violence has made
contributions to a marriage ‘more arduous’ or that it had a ‘discernible impact’
or ‘significant adverse impact’ upon the claimant’s contributions, will
inevitably be problematic since the value of any evidence depends upon how
the judicial officer applies the term(s)/test(s). Reithmuller FM was so satisfied
in W & W & L:
An adjustment on this basis is not to be undertaken lightly. It is important to find a
specific evidentiary foundation. In this case there appears to have been a long history
of violence in the relationship, as set out above. In the Family Report the mother
describes the life in the household like ‘walking on eggshells’. She exhibits an
ongoing fear of Mr W. Her relationship with D was effectively severed during this
time. The children A and B were subject to family violence. I am satisfied that there
is sufficient evidence of specific violence, and that it shows that her task of
homemaker and provider of a nurturing environment was made far more difficult.105
There is a strategic aspect that arises out of the requirement to prove the
impact on the victim’s contributions. Parties who wish to claim a Kennon
contribution may find it perilous to rely only on an argument that their
contributions were reduced as a consequence of the conduct. If the Kennon
claim is unsuccessful (and abuse is often difficult to prove many years later)
then they risk a devaluation of their share based on the actual contributions
they claim. Thus, there may be an incentive to argue all the contributions one
can, just in case; but doing so may diminish the chance of establishing the
second limb. In the case of Lynton v Lynton106 the wife established the claimed
abuse and that this significantly contributed to her suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. However, she worked during the marriage and
gave evidence that, despite the husband’s treatment of her, she ‘continued to
provide for the family, she maintained the house, cared for the children,
attended to the book-work and provided the special care’ required for two of
their children.107 Dawe J made no Kennon adjustment and did not consider the
‘more arduous’ aspect of the principle:
104 A & A [2011] FCWA 98 at [110] per Thackray CJ.
105 [2007] FMCAfam 438 at [197].
106 [2010] FamCA 690; BC201050775.
107 Ibid, at [129].
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The court is satisfied that the wife has established the violent conduct, however the
evidence has not established on the necessary standard of proof (balance of
probabilities) that this violent abusive conduct by the husband had a ‘significant
adverse impact’ upon the wife’s contribution to the marriage. In fact, the evidence
supports the conclusion that notwithstanding the violent and abusive conduct by the
husband, the wife continued to make substantial contributions to the household and
in particular the welfare of the family.108
Naturally, having to prove impact invites questions of causation, which may
prove difficult where the claimant suffers from a medical condition worsened
by the violence, as explained by Altobelli FM:
. . . However, the Full Court goes on to say that such a course of violent conduct is
‘demonstrated’ to have had a certain impact. The use of the word ‘demonstrated’
clearly illustrates the need for the claimant to establish that a certain impact is
causally linked to the violent conduct. The wife’s evidence does not so satisfy me.
Even if she were to convince me to the requisite standard of the impact on her
contributions, I could not be satisfied that this was attributable to family violence
because her medical condition was much more complex than to allow that simple
causative conclusion.109
Are there, however, circumstances in which the court draws an inference as
to the impact on contributions of an established violent course of conduct
during a marriage? The Kennon principle’s predecessor, Doherty,110 has been
used to support the use of inferences. Baker J, with whom Fogarty and
Hannon JJ agreed, found that, while the trial Judge did not precisely spell out
the link between the recorded violence and the impact, ‘it is clear from his
findings that the wife’s contribution as homemaker and parent may have been
increased as a result thereof’.111
Subsequent to Kennon, the unreported Full Court case of Spagnardi &
Spagnardi112 considered whether a court may draw such an inference. Their
Honours concluded that Kennon:
. . . has established it is necessary to provide evidence to establish:113
• The incidence of domestic violence;
• The effect of domestic violence; and
108 Lynton & Lynton [2010] FamCA 690; BC201050775 at [130] per Dawe J. Notably, nor did
the wife receive any extra weighting on the basis this amounted to a ‘special’ contribution
(see [142]–[143], despite the suggestion in some cases that such a scenario may so qualify:
see JEL v DDF (2001) FLC 93-075 at 88,331; (2000) 28 Fam LR 1; [2000] FamCA 1353.
See also Dowdell & Public Trustee of the Northern Territory [2007] FamCA 1276;
BC200750312 at [162] per Strickland J.
109 Bingham & Bingham [2009] FMCAfam 99; BC200900560 at [47] per Altobelli FM; See
also Jarrett & Jarrett [2009] FMCAfam 55; BC200900557 at [92]–[93] per McGuire FM;
Bacasa & Bacasa [2011] FMCAfam 198; BC201102743 at [73] per Dunkley FM and Dakin
& Dakin [2011] FMCAfam 177; BC201101738 at [21] per Sexton FM.
110 (1995) 20 Fam LR 137; (1995) 127 FLR 343; (1996) FLC 92-652.
111 Ibid, at [141].
112 (Unreported, Appeal No EA26 of 2003) as cited in Stellard v Dresden Stellard [2011]
FamCA 718; BC201150691.
113 The requisite standard of proof in property settlement proceedings is the civil ‘balance of
probabilities’. Under s 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), in determining whether a
party has proven his or her case on the balance of probabilities, the court can consider the
nature of the cause of action, the nature of the subject-matter and the gravity of the matters
alleged. Note that with a Kennon claim, the victim not only has the onus of proving that the
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• Evidence to enable the court to quantify the effect of that violence upon the
party’s capacity to ‘contribute’ as defined by section 79(4).114
Their Honours found in Spagnardi that, in that case, the complete absence
of evidence of how the conduct affected the claimant’s ability to contribute
was fatal to the claimant’s particular Kennon claim. However, as noted by
O’Reilly J in Stellard v Dresden Stellard,115 the Full Court in Spagnardi also
referred with approval to a statement by the trial Judge to the effect that there
would be some cases where the proved facts would allow an inference of
impact to be drawn: ‘there must be cases where it is obvious or a very likely
inference from the fact’.116 O’Reilly J takes the same approach in Stellard.117
This supports the approach taken in Doherty and so it may be said that there
are cases where the impact on the claimant is self-evident from the established
facts. For example, one might imagine an extreme case where the violence
results in a disability in the victim or an extended period of hospitalisation.
Within the sample of judgments, there were varying judicial opinions about
whether or not inferences should be drawn. In Whelan & Whelan for instance,
Harman FM did so:118
Whether or not that is possible in order to establish a ‘Kennon’ claim, the court
needs to make some finding about the effect of the conduct of one party upon the
contributions made by the other.
It may not be automatically assumed in a particular case that an effect on a party’s
condition automatically means there is an effect upon the party’s contributions . . .
I am in the context of this case prepared to infer that the history of the husband’s
violence, in fact, meant that the contributions for which the husband concedes the
wife made, were made in circumstances, where they were significantly more
arduous as a result of the husband’s conduct than they would have otherwise been
if he had not behaved in the way that he did.119
Altobelli FM also demonstrated in Kozovska & Kozovski his willingness to
draw an inference between the impact of violence and the ability to make
contribution in one matter:
I am left in no doubt that the evidence provided by both the wife and the daughter
satisfies me, without having to draw any inference, that her contribution was
rendered more arduous. In any event I would be prepared to infer that the
contribution was rendered more arduous based on comments made by the Full Court
in Doherty (1996) FLC 92-652 at 82,683 per Baker J.120
Conversely, in two other 2009 decisions handed down before and after
Kozovska, Bingham & Bingham and Kucera & Kucera, Altobelli FM said that,
violence occurred, but also that the violence had a discernible impact on them. See also
S Middleton, ‘Domestic violence and contributions to the welfare of the family: Why not
negative?’ (2002) 16 AJFL 26.
114 Spagnardi & Spagnardi (unreported, Appeal No EA26 of 2003) as cited at [47]–[48] of
Stellard v Dresden Stellard [2011] FamCA 718; BC201150691.
115 [2011] FamCA 718; BC201150691.
116 Ibid at [45].
117 Ibid at [292].
118 [2010] FamCA 530.
119 Whelan & Whelan [2010] FamCA 530 at [177] (Watts J); See also Denton & Denton [2011]
FMCAfam 1282 at [141] (Harman FM).
120 [2009] FMCAfam 1014; BC200908956 at [76] per Altobelli FM (delivered in September).
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as he read Kennon (and without referring to Doherty), ‘little or no room is left
for inference’.121 Further, in a case preceding all these decisions his Honour
said:
Moreover, none of her evidence actually explains how her contributions were
rendered more arduous. At most, I am left to draw an inference that this was plainly
a case where, in view of the nature of the allegations, and the findings I have made,
it is reasonable to infer that her contributions were more arduous. I don’t believe that
the Full Court’s decision in Kennon allows me scope to make these findings based
on an inference in a situation where the evidence could easily have been led.122
Again, we see a picture of confusion as to the use of inferences in this
regard. Practically, this is significant: precisely how does one prove that
homemaker tasks are made more difficult, especially if a judicial officer is not
prepared to draw an inference to that effect? In the sample cases this proved
difficult to establish. Five claimants simply claimed the impact of the violence
was that their homemaker tasks were more difficult than they ought to have
been but for the violence and received an adjustment. Eight others made the
same claim but were unsuccessful.123
The way forward
Clearly a flood of claimants has not eventuated; over a 6 year period only 57
first instance matters appear in AUSTLII that have included a consideration of
Kennon and there have been an average of only four cases a year cited in
AUSTLII where an award is made on that basis. However, as noted earlier, we
know that violence is a commonly raised factor amongst the family court
population and the separated population in general. The cases reviewed
suggest that Kennon is not always raised by legal practitioners, even when the
circumstances might lend themselves to such a claim. Further,
self-represented parties would be unlikely to know about the Kennon
principle.124 As one judicial officer noted of a litigant in person:
It appeared to me that the wife’s allegations, although not clearly, if at all, articulated
as such, might fall within the decision of the Full Court in Kennon . . .125
A lack of awareness of Kennon and what is required to establish a
successful claim may have contributed to the cases that failed to address
specifically impact on contribution, or to provide any evidence of impact
and/or to seek lower percentage adjustments based on Kennon than the
judicial officer would have awarded.
121 Bingham & Bingham [2009] FMCAfam 99; BC200900560 at [25], delivered in February
(see also the comments at [48] in that decision). This paragraph is repeated by his Honour
verbatim in Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073 at [16], delivered in
October.
122 Shaw & Shaw [2008] FMCAfam 1024; BC200808336 at [154].
123 Compounding the obvious difficulties of proving impact, there are the normal factors that
affect the likelihood of success of any claim, for example, the relative quality of legal
representation, unexpressed judicial values and the way witnesses present in court.
124 Three of the 57 claimants in our sample were self-represented.
125 Hutton & Hutton [2007] FamCA 1701 at [202]. The self-represented wife in this case made
claims of serious assaults which were denied completely by the husband. While she did not
argue Kennon, Carter J noted its relevance however the wife did not lead evidence which
supported her claims of violence and so they were not accepted.
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The Kennon factor, which has attracted little superior reconsideration,126 is
a complex combination of vague phrases and it is not surprising then that,
possibly like some legal practitioners, there are judicial officers who appear to
be unclear about the test in general and whether it fits the facts in a particular
case. When combined with the Full Court’s exhortation that this is a principle
of exceptional application, this may well contribute to the fact that there are
so few successful claimants. Take for example the comments of Bell J, who
declined a Kennon award in this case:
I do not believe that the Kennon principle totally applies but it comes very close
to it in that her contributions, which were of the physical nature, were made more
difficult by his overbearing and bullying manner . . .
I take into consideration that during the cohabitation not only did she do the work
to which I have referred but I consider she did something over and above that in
looking after the physical disabilities of the father, and whilst I am not quite sure
whether that is Kennon or not, putting up with the abrasive and bullying behaviour
of the father when he [sic] demanded that the children and the mother act no better
than servants towards him.127
In other judgments, statements such as ‘[i]f I am incorrect in allowing a
Kennon-type weighting . . . in my view it would be open for me to make some
allowance, in this regard, for family violence factors . . .’128 are indicative of
a lack of clarity. That lack of clarity has contributed to one judicial officer,
Brewster FM, choosing not to apply Kennon,129 citing the comments of
Altobelli FM in Kozovska & Kozovski as giving him comfort in his
position.130
While we do not concur with Brewster FM’s reasoning in general regarding
Kennon,131 it is a fair criticism that, as expressed to date, the Kennon principle
leaves too many grey areas resulting in judicial indeterminacy with diverse
interpretation of its wording. For example, it is evident that ‘significant
adverse impact’, ‘significantly more arduous’ and ‘discernible impact’ are
approached by different judicial officers in varying ways, and there is some
confusion as to whether impact is a one limbed test requiring proof that a
contribution has been made more arduous, or whether it is broader than that.
In addition, there is a lack of consensus about what evidence is required to
establish impact. Some judicial officers consider it appropriate to ‘infer’ that
the evidence of violence was sufficient to demonstrate that the ability to
contribute had been impacted upon. In other cases, the entire Kennon claim
126 As noted earlier, Baranski & Baranski (2012) 259 FLR 122; [2012] FamCAFC 18;
BC201250070 did clarify one aspect of the application of Kennon, namely, the question of
post-separation violence.
127 Columbia & Columbia [2009] FamCA 311 at [19] and [46] (emphasis added).
128 Baranski & Baranski [2010] FMCAfam 918; BC201010421 at [425] per Brown FM.
129 Brewster FM’s view expressed in Palmer & Palmer (2010) 244 FLR 121; [2010] FMCAfam
999; BC201007281 that Kennon is not binding and lacks any jurisprudential basis, was one
of eight grounds of appeal in Palmer & Palmer (2012) FLC 93-514; [2012] FamCAFC 159;
BC201250606. However, this ground was not pursued by applicant’s counsel as explained
at [62]. Other judicial officers (including in the Full Court) have not endorsed Brewster FM’s
position.
130 [2009] FMCAfam 1014; BC200908956 at [77].
131 Notably, the two later Full Court judgments referred to above n 119, which upheld Kennon
adjustments, did not refer to Palmer & Palmer.
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was rejected on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to establish that
the violence had made such an impact. Concern has also been expressed at
how one values a Kennon claim in terms of percentage adjustment.
In terms of clarifying how best to take account of family violence in
property proceedings, the only options are fresh Full Court direction or
legislative amendment. However, the very small number of cases where
Kennon is argued, together with the likely resources (both financial and
emotional) of those litigants, dramatically reduce the chance of the former
option. Moreover, there has been little superior judicial appetite evidenced for
a reconsideration of this principle.
Middleton has argued in detail how legislative reform could direct a more
uniform approach to domestic violence and property division.132 The
Australian Law Reform Commission also supports legislative reform:
Commentators, law reform bodies and others have raised strong arguments that the
Family Law Act should be amended to recognise family violence expressly as a
relevant factor in property disputes. . . . Legislative recognition may have a number
of advantages over continued reliance on the Kennon precedent . . . [It] will provide
greater confidence for victims of violence and their legal representatives who seek
to raise family violence allegations in property disputes, in particular, out-of-court
settlements.133
An obvious reform would be the introduction of a mandatory consideration
requiring judicial officers to take account of the impact of established violence
on contributions, thereby removing the possibility of it being ignored due to
pleading defects. The Family Law Council proposed that s 79(4) be amended
to include a new subsection ‘79(4A)’ which would direct the court to have
regard to the effects of any family violence on the contributions of the
parties.134
Another Family Law Council proposal suggests that the future needs factors
in s 75(2) be amended to include135 ‘[t]he extent to which the financial
circumstances of either party have been affected by family violence
perpetrated by a party to the marriage’.136 The cases are very clear that
Kennon only applies to the assessment of contribution under s 79; this is the
retrospective aspect of the enquiry in a property settlement case. However, if
that is the only basis for an adjustment, it will not account for any ongoing
impacts of violence on the victim. Middleton has suggested that the future
needs aspect has been overlooked since the development of the Kennon
approach.137 Indeed, she has argued that given the difficulties associated with
applying Kennon it should be abandoned, preferring amendment of s 75(2) as
the key legislative solution, however allowing a Kennon type defence to
claims of reduced contributions by victims.
Brewster FM, who eschews Kennon as articulated, proposes that the more
132 Middleton, above n 41.
133 Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence: Improving Legal Frameworks,
Consultation paper, 2010, pp 426–8.
134 Family Law Council (Des Semple), above n 97, p 7.
135 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 135, p 427. See also, Family Law Council
(Des Semple), above n 97; Evans, above n 9.
136 Family Law Council (Des Semple), above n 97, p 7.
137 Middleton, above n 41, at 9.
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appropriate approach when considering domestic violence would be to
incorporate a ‘negative contribution’ provision within the legislation. This
would involve deducting from the contributions made by the perpetrator of the
violence to family welfare, rather than adding to the contributions of the
victim. Indeed, favouring legislative reform, Brewster FM says that it is the
legislature, rather than the courts, that should be charged with what he
characterises as ‘an exercise in public policy’.138 Of course, this is no more or
less a matter of public policy than many other developments of principle by
the family court; the court must determine how to apply the relevant
provisions of the FLA and, as usual in that legislation, the property provisions
are broad leaving ample room for judicial interpretation which necessarily
takes account of public policy issues.
The purpose of Kennon is not to compensate or punish;139 however it
appears from judicial comments that it is difficult to separate these concepts
from the notion of addressing contributions. The use of emotive language such
as ‘arduous’ does not appear to assist in separating these concepts.140
Moreover, as Kennon considerations are limited to ‘exceptional cases’ where
there is a ‘course of conduct’ in which the impact of violence was
demonstrably significant, the removal of ideas of compensation or punishment
proves even more difficult. This is because it is the very serious long term
abuse of a party, with clearly detrimental impacts on that person, which will
most easily establish a Kennon claim. It may be possible to reduce, or
eliminate, the conflation of potential goals of making an adjustment through
clear, legislative articulation of a principle, which would help to normalise the
consideration of violence in property disputes and the basis of such
consideration. For all these reasons, we support legislative reform.
While understanding Middleton’s reasons for arguing for the abandonment
of a Kennon-like approach to contributions (which are strengthened by our
findings), we consider there is much to be said for the Family Law Council’s
proposal that both ss 79(4) and 75(2) be amended. Given the difficulty family
law decision makers have historically, and repeatedly, shown in giving proper
weight to the impacts of violence in the family, we believe the broader
consideration of violence allowed by referring directly to violence under both
heads is preferable. However the Council recommended the inclusion of quite
general provisions; this would still leave considerable room for judicial
interpretation. The difficulties identified with the application of Kennon argue
in favour of there being more detail in any provisions to clarify their ambit and
perhaps the introduction of a specific objects section to identify the goal of the
amendment.
138 Palmer & Palmer (2010) 244 FLR 121; [2010] FMCAfam 999; BC201007281 at [100].
139 Despite the question in this regard raised by Dewar (in J Dewar, ‘Family Violence and
Property Distribution: Where Now?’, Conference Handbook, 2000, proceedings of the 9th
National Family Law Conference, Sydney, Family Law Section, Law Council of Australia
and Television Network, pp 293–8, cited in Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032;
BC200909073 at [108]), nothing in the case law supports such an interpretation. Note the
comment to that effect by Altobelli FM in Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032;
BC200909073 at [110].
140 And we would suggest resulted in sending Brewster FM down a fruitless path of comparison
of ‘arduous’ forms of employment, ignoring that the basis of a Kennon claim is founded on
a course of conduct by one party towards the other.
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This is not to suggest that such a legislative solution would result in easy
decision making. Any potential legislative amendment would not alleviate
issues of proof of violence and there would still need to be evidence relevant
to the consequences of the violence, whatever legislative route was taken. The
question of drawing inferences, however, could be resolved by legislative
direction. Sheehan and Smyth suggest that if violence were to be included in
ss 79(4) and/or 75(2), the term would also need to be defined within this part
of the Act.141 The Family Law Council proposes that ‘the definition of family
violence in Part VII of the Family Law Act be adopted in Part VIII’.142 Since
that report, we now have a much more detailed definition of family violence
which applies to the whole FLA, s 4AB. That section provides examples of
what may constitute exposure of a child to violence (s 4AB(4)); likewise a
subsection could be included to provide examples of what amounts to impact
in relation to contributions. Further, the question of how post-separation
violence relates to contributions pre- and post-separation could be clarified.
Finally, consideration could be given to whether the ‘exceptional’/’narrow
band of cases’ rider should be retained. We would suggest not and argue that
this should be dealt with through careful drafting of criteria for application of
the principle. If the principle is sound that violence can be factored in to the
extent it affects contribution, then a party ought to be able to claim that and
have to make their case, without any superimposed vague requirement of
exceptionality.143 Trivial claims will be treated accordingly, just as are trivial
claims of contribution. In these ways, codification could ‘clarify . . . a number
of loose ends . . . and offer guidance to litigants and their advisors on what
conduct is relevant, as well as when and how . . .’.144 Thus, while a degree of
ambiguity could be removed by legislative reform, discretion (and thus
subjectivity) would of course remain in determining whether property division
should ultimately be affected by family violence and, if so, by how much. This
is inevitable within the highly discretionary system we have.
If there were legislative reform, then one might also expect improved
appreciation of the relevance of family violence to property disputes by the
various professionals working in this field. It is accepted in the parenting area
that family violence has not been well understood and there has been criticism
about a general failure to take proper account of its relevance to family law
proceedings. It would seem that changes in this regard to Pt VII145 are starting
to have some positive effects in terms of judicial appreciation of the nature of
family violence and the way cases are prepared by lawyers.146
With or without legislative reform, an important strategy for providing
141 G Sheehan and B Smyth, ‘Spousal Violence and Post-Separation Financial Outcomes’
(2000) 14 AJFL 102.
142 Family Law Council (Des Semple), above n 96, p 7; See also Evans, above n 9.
143 This resonates with the increasing judicial reluctance to accept that there are ‘special’
contributions: see, eg, Smith & Fields [2012] FamCA 510; BC201250415.
144 Dewar, above n 141, pp 293–8 in Kucera & Kucera [2009] FMCAfam 1032; BC200909073
at [108] per Altobelli FM.
145 Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth).
146 This is based on the report by the Chief Justice, Diana Bryant, of research being undertaken
in the Family Court of Australia by one of the judges: D Bryant, ‘Recent Developments in
Family Law in Australia’, Parentage, Equality and Gender, 2nd International Family Law
and Practice Conference, London Metropolitan University, 3–5 July 2013, London, England.
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more certainty for parties and ensuring that claims are made in appropriate
cases is education, both at law school and via ongoing accreditation courses.
Legal professionals (and others) working in the area need better knowledge
both about family violence and also regarding the appropriate way to make a
claim for adjustment on the basis of family violence in property settlement
matters. Further, given the number of self-represented litigants, and for those
who resolve matters privately, documentation provided by the courts and the
various legal aid departments could address this issue, as could training of
family dispute resolution practitioners. A more uniform and widespread
understanding of the application of this test can only work to increase
recognition of potential claims and improve the presentation of evidence.
Indeed, the flow on effect of this might be to increase the opportunity for
superior judicial comment on Kennon which in turn would provide greater
clarity and certainty.
Conclusion
Family violence is not just an issue of the protection of children. As Chisholm
highlights, ‘the family law system, and each component in it, needs to
encourage and facilitate the disclosure of family violence, ensure that it is
understood, and act effectively upon that understanding’.147 Dewar agrees that
‘[t]he problem is . . . everything depends on violence being properly
identified, understood and responded to by all actors in the system; . . . this is
precisely where the Australian system has failed.’148 These sentiments apply
to all the ways in which family violence might be relevant to the breakdown
of an intimate relationship. It is very convenient to characterise the relevance
of family violence in a narrow way, as originally occurred in relation to
parenting matters. However, there are very broad implications to the impacts
of violence on women in the home which are, to a large extent, ignored when
we talk about the division of property. Brewster FM believes this is a matter
for the legislature, because Kennon is the reflection of a ‘public policy’ issue.
As indicated above, we agree that a legislative solution would be preferable;
however until that eventuates, judicial officers have no choice but to fill the
gap that exists.
Kennon represented a welcome advance in this regard, however, it is now
becoming clear that the principle as originally formulated is not sufficiently
robust. We have not sought in this article to build a comprehensive argument
as to precisely how the court, or legislature for that matter, should address
domestic violence in property proceedings. Rather, our aim was to explore
how the Kennon principle is being applied. Our findings make a compelling
case as to the need for a fresh consideration of the issue; hopefully they will
help reignite this debate. With the present focus on family violence in
parenting matters, it is an opportune time for the spotlight to be brought back
to how best to ensure violence in the home is appropriately considered in
property cases.
147 R Chisholm, Family Courts Violence Review, Commonwealth Attorney-General’s
Department, November 2009, p 5.
148 J Dewar, ‘Can the Centre Hold? Reflections on Two Decades of Family Law Reform in
Australia’ (2010) 24 AJFL 139 at 146.
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